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Abstract
I study how envy in the workplace affects the optimal employment contract when employ-
ees differ in their productivity and this is their private information. The employees’ envy
towards their colleagues distorts the levels of effort exerted by the less productive employ-
ees. However, when employees are also envious towards their boss this distortion is mitigated.
Keywords: Adverse-Selection Model, Envious Employees.
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1 Introduction
Lavish CEO compensation often makes headlines and many commentators highlight how exec-
utives’ bonuses and perks can rankle. This is especially so when there is a hefty difference with
the average worker pay (see Mishel and Sabadish, 2012). Moreover, pay inequality among peers
can also be detrimental to the work atmosphere as highlighted by recent experimental evidence
(see Breza et al., 2015). Surveys and empirical evidence show that employees are interested in
how their wage compares to the firm’s profits and/or to the colleagues’ wage (see Bewley, 1995,
1999, Blinder and Choi, 1990, Campbell and Kamlani, 1997, and Card et al., 2012).
This paper studies the interaction between envy towards the boss and the colleagues. So
far these two forms of envy have been studied separately. Dur and Glazer (2008) have studied
the case in which employees are envious towards their boss. The present article departs from
their analysis considering that employees can differ in their productivity and this is their own
private information. Moreover, like Desiraju and Sappington (2007) and von Siemens (2011,
2012), I assume that employees can envy their peers. In the model, I consider both forms of
envy simultaneously and I highlight the presence of an interaction effect between them.
By focusing on an adverse-selection problem, this paper also complements the literature that
studies optimal incentive contracts when employees are motivated by fairness considerations in
a moral hazard setting (see among others Bartling and von Siemens, 2010, Englmaier and
Wambach, 2010, Kragl and Schmid, 2009, and Neilson and Stowe, 2010).1
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1With the exception of Englmaier and Wambach (2010), the other articles cited in the text study a situation
in which the employees envy their colleagues but not their boss.
1
2 The Model
I develop a model with one principal (the boss) and multiple agents (employees). The boss offers
a contract to her employees which consists of a wage ω and effort e. The effort of each employee
is observable and verifiable.
There is a continuum of employees with measure one. Employees may differ in their cost
of exerting effort (henceforth, productivity) θ with θ ∈ {θ, θ} and ∆θ = θ − θ > 0; µ is the
fraction of high-productivity employees and 1− µ is the fraction of low-productivity employees
and µ ∈ (0, 1). Employees are risk neutral, wealth constrained, and have a reservation wage of
zero. The low-productivity and the high-productivity employees’ utilities are:
VL = ωL −
θ
2
e2L − α(max{Π−RL, 0}) − β(max{RH −RL, 0});
VH = ωH −
θ
2
e2H − α(max{Π−RH , 0}) − β(max{RL −RH , 0}).
(1)
where Π are the boss’ profits and Ri is the material rent paid to employee i with i = L,H. The
material rent is defined as the difference between the wage and the cost of exerting effort.
Employees may suffer a utility loss whenever they feel worse off than their boss and/or
colleagues. An employee may be envious towards the boss if the difference between the boss’
profits and his own rent is positive. The parameter α ≥ 0 measures the employees’ envy towards
their boss. An employee may be envious towards his colleagues if he receives a lower rent than
that of other employees in the firm. The parameter β ≥ 0 measures the employees’ envy towards
a higher-net-earner colleague. α and β are common knowledge.2
The timing of the game is as follows. In stage 0, each employee is informed about his own
type; in stage 1, the boss offers a menu of contracts consisting of levels of effort and wages; in
stage 2, employees independently decide whether or not to accept the contract. Once hired the
employment contract and the type of each employee become common knowledge;3 in stage 3,
the effort is exerted, production is undertaken, wages are paid, and profits are realized.
2.1 The Benchmark Case
If productivity is observable, the boss can exactly compensate each employee for his production
costs. Since there will be no rent inequality, the employees’ envy may solely be directed towards
their boss. The wages cover the cost of effort plus the employee’s disutility due to envy, making
each employee indifferent between accepting and rejecting the contract, given the required level
of effort:
ωL =
θ
2
e2L + α(Π−RL); ωH =
θ
2
e2H + α(Π −RH). (2)
Since RL = ωL −
θ
2e
2
L and RH = ωH −
θ
2e
2
H , equation (2) can be rewritten as:
ωL =
θ
2
e2L +
α
1 + α
Π; ωH =
θ
2
e2H +
α
1 + α
Π. (3)
Proposition 1 illustrates the optimal contract:
2The assumption that employees compare material rents is supported by social psychologists like Adams (1963)
and Festinger (1962). They argue that workers desire a fair relation between production costs and income.
3There is no renegotiation between the boss and the employees. This assumption allows the employees to
compare their rents.
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Proposition 1. With perfect information on the employees’ productivity,
 required levels of effort are: eFBL =
1
θ
< eFBH =
1
θ
;
 wages are: ωFBL =
1
2θ
+ α(θ+µ∆θ)
2(1+2α)θθ
< ωFBH =
1
2θ +
α(θ+µ∆θ)
2(1+2α)θθ
.
With perfect information on the employees’ productivity, the levels of effort exerted by
the employees are not affected by α. But a higher α has a positive impact on wages, i.e.
∂ωFB
i
∂α
= (θ+µ∆θ)
2(1+2α)2θθ
> 0 with i = L,H. An employee who is envious towards his boss receives
a higher wage irrespective of whether he has high or low productive abilities. The boss shares
her profits with her employees and α has a negative impact on them. Thus, the presence of
envy towards the boss affects the employees’ wages even when there is perfect information. In
contrast, the presence of envy towards colleagues is inconsequential at this stage of the analysis.
3 Screening Problem
When the employees’ productivity is their private information, the boss maximizes her profits
subject to participation and incentive constraints.
Proposition 2 illustrates the optimal contract:
Proposition 2. With asymmetric information on the employees’ productivity,
 required levels of effort are: eSBL =
(1−µ)(1+α)
θ(1−µ)(1+α)+[β+µ(1+α)]∆θ
< eSBH =
1
θ
;
 wages satisfy the following:
ωSBL =
θ
2
(eSBL )
2 +
α
1 + α
Π+
β
2(1 + α)
∆θ(eSBL )
2;
ωSBH =
θ
2
(eSBH )
2 +
α
1 + α
Π+
β
2(1 + α)
∆θ(eSBL )
2 +
1
2
∆θ(eSBL )
2.
(4)
To better understand the complementarity between these two forms of envy, I start analyzing
them separately.
When employees are only envious towards their boss, i.e. α > 0 and β = 0, the levels of
effort exerted by the employees are not affected by α:
eSBL =
1− µ
θ(1− µ) + µ∆θ
; eSBH =
1
θ
.
The presence of asymmetric information only leads to an information rent given to the high-
productivity employees and a distortion in the level of effort exerted by the low-productivity
employees. However, this is the standard distortion observed in an adverse-selection model and
is not affected by the presence of envy towards the boss.
When employees are only envious towards their colleagues, i.e. α = 0 and β > 0, β has a
negative impact on the effort provided by the low-productivity employees:
eSBL =
1− µ
θ(1− µ) + (β + µ)∆θ
; eSBH =
1
θ
.
As β increases so do the material rents paid to both types of employees. The boss has to
compensate the low-productivity employees who suffer a utility loss since the high-productivity
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ones receive an information rent. This gives rise to a material rent which is given to the low-
productivity employees. In addition to the information rent, the boss must pay the same material
rent to the high-productivity employees to avoid them mimicking the low-productivity ones.
Since these material rents are costly for the boss and they depend on eL, the boss finds it
profitable to further distort away from efficiency the effort of the low-productivity employees
with respect to the standard adverse-selection problem without envy.4 Unlike the envy towards
their boss, the envy towards a higher-net-earner colleague magnifies the distortion in the effort
exerted by the low-productivity employees.
When both forms of envy are present, β continues to impact negatively on the effort exerted
by the low-productivity employees. However, since α > 0, the distortion in the low-productivity
employees’ effort is mitigated.5 Intuitively, for the reasons previously explained, the boss must
provide both types of employees with some material rents because β > 0. This leads to a
reduction in the differences between the boss’ profits and the material rents, which are the
objects of the employees’ envy towards the boss. In other words, being envious towards a
higher-net-earner colleague reduces the envy towards the boss. Since an increase in eL leads to
an increase in RL and RH , and then in a reduction in the differences Π−RL and Π−RH , the boss
finds it profitable to distort less the effort exerted by the low-productivity employees as compared
to the case in which α = 0. This result demonstrates the presence of a complementarity between
these two forms of envy:
∂2eSBL
∂α∂β
=
∆θ(1− µ)
[θ(1− µ)(1 + α) + [β + µ(1 + α)]∆θ]2
−
2β∆θ2(1− µ)
[θ(1− µ)(1 + α) + [β + µ(1 + α)]∆θ]3
> 0.
4 Conclusions
Envy affects the optimal contracts offered to heterogenous employees and its impact crucially
depends on who is the object of the employees’ envy. Envy never distorts the effort of the
high-productivity employees. However, it distorts the effort of the low-productivity employees
when the envy is directed towards the high-productivity colleagues. This distortion is mitigated
when employees also envy their boss. I shed light on the complementarity between these two
forms of envy which is new in the literature.
A Appendix A
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Profits are given by:
Π = µ[eH − ωH ] + (1− µ)[eL − ωL], (5)
4As in the previous case, since the material rents do not depend on the effort exerted by the high-productivity
employees, optimization calls for no distortion away from the first-best for these employees.
5α and β have an opposite impact on the levels of effort exerted by the less productive employees:
∂eSBL
∂α
=
β∆θ(1− µ)
[θ(1− µ)(1 + α) + [β + µ(1 + α)]∆θ]2
> 0;
∂eSBL
∂β
= −
(1 + α)∆θ(1− µ)
[θ(1− µ)(1 + α) + [β + µ(1 + α)]∆θ]2
< 0.
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The boss maximizes equation (5) subject to equation (3). Profits can be rewritten as:
Π =
1 + α
1 + 2α
[
µ
(
eH −
θ
2
e2H
)
+ (1− µ)
(
eL −
θ
2
e2L
)]
. (6)
Applying the first order condition with respect to eH and eL, the levels of effort are obtained:
eFBL =
1
θ
; eFBH =
1
θ
. (7)
Substituting the levels of effort into equation (6), profits are obtained:
ΠFB =
1 + α
1 + 2α
[
µ
(
1
θ
−
1
2θ
)
+ (1− µ)
(
1
θ
−
1
2θ
)]
After some simple computations, profits are equal to:
ΠFB =
1 + α
1 + 2α
(
θ + µ∆θ
2θθ
)
. (8)
And the first-best wages are:
ωFBL =
θ
2
eFB2L +
α
1 + α
ΠFB ⇔ ωFBL =
1
2θ
+
α
1 + 2α
(
θ + µ∆θ
2θθ
)
;
ωFBH =
θ
2
eFB2H +
α
1 + α
ΠFB ⇔ ωFBH =
1
2θ
+
α
1 + 2α
(
θ + µ∆θ
2θθ
)
.
(9)
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The participation and incentive constraints are:
ωL −
θ
2
e2L − α(Π−RL)− β(RH −RL) ≥ 0 (PCL)
ωH −
θ
2
e2H − α(Π−RH) ≥ 0 (PCH)
ωL −
θ
2
e2L − α(Π−RL)− β(RH −RL) ≥ ωH −
θ
2
e2H − α(Π− RˆH)− β(RH − RˆH) (ICL)
ωH −
θ
2
e2H − α(Π−RH) ≥ ωL −
θ
2
e2L − α(Π− RˆL)− β(RH − RˆL) (ICH)
RˆH = ωH −
θ
2e
2
H is the rent that the low-productivity employees attain when they pretend to be
high; RˆL = ωL−
θ
2e
2
L is the rent that the high-productivity employees attain when they pretend
to be low.
First, if equations (ICH) and (PCL) are satisfied, then
ωH −
θ
2
e2H − α(Π−RH) ≥
∆θ
2
e2L(1 + α+ β) ≥ 0. (10)
Equation (10) reflects the fact that the high-productivity employees receive higher benefits
from production than the low-productivity ones. The participation constraint for the high-
productivity employees is satisfied
ωH −
θ
2
e2H − α(Π−RH) ≥ 0.
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Furthermore, it will not be binding because ∆θ2 e
2
L(1 + α+ β) ≥ 0 has to be satisfied as well. In
contrast, the participation constraint for the low-productivity employees must be binding.
Next, the incentive constraint for the high-productivity employees must be binding:
ωH =
θ
2
e2H + α(Π−RH) +
∆θ
2
e2L(1 + α+ β).
If this incentive were not binding, the boss could increase ωH slightly and keep all constraints
satisfied. And the incentive constraint for the low-productivity employees, that is
ωL ≥
θ
2
e2L + α(Π−RL) + β(RH −RL)−
∆θ
2
(e2H − e
2
L)(1 + α+ β)
cannot be binding given that ∆θ2 (e
2
H − e
2
L)(1 + α+ β) ≥ 0 has to be satisfied.
The participation constraint for the low-productivity employees (PCL) and the incentive
constraint for the high-productivity employees (ICH) are binding. Using PCL and ICH , the
optimal wages satisfy equation (4).
The boss maximizes profits subject to equation (4). Profits can be rewritten as:
Π(eL, eH) =
1 + α
1 + 2α
[
µ
(
eH −
θ
2
e2H −
1 + α+ β
2(1 + α)
∆θe2L
)
+ (1− µ)
(
eL −
θ
2
e2L −
β
2(1 + α)
∆θe2L
)]
.
(11)
Applying the first order condition with respect to eH and eL, the levels of effort are obtained:
∂Π(eL, eH)
∂eL
: −µ
(
1 + α+ β
1 + α
∆θeL
)
+ (1− µ)
(
1− θeL −
β
1 + α
∆θeL
)
= 0
⇔ eSBL =
(1− µ)(1 + α)
θ(1− µ)(1 + α) + [β + µ(1 + α)]∆θ
∂Π(eL, eH)
∂eH
:
(
1 + α
1 + 2α
)
µ (1− θeH) = 0⇔ e
SB
H =
1
θ
Substituting the levels of effort into equations (4) and (11), wages and profits are obtained:
ωSBL =
θ
2
(eSBL )
2 +
β
2(1 + α)
∆θ(eSBL )
2 +
α
1 + α
Π(eSBL , e
SB
H );
ωSBH =
θ
2
(eSBH )
2 +
1 + α+ β
2(1 + α)
∆θ(eSBL )
2 +
α
1 + α
Π(eSBL , e
SB
H );
ΠSB =
1 + α
1 + 2α
[
µ
(
eSBH −
θ
2
(eSBH )
2 −
1 + α+ β
2(1 + α)
∆θ(eSBL )
2
)]
+
+
1 + α
1 + 2α
[
(1− µ)
(
eSBL −
θ
2
(eSBL )
2 −
β
2(1 + α)
∆θ(eSBL )
2
)]
.
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